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SHOULD PUBLIC EDUCATION BE A FEDERAL FUNDAMENTAL 
RIGHT? 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Education is not a commodity the State provides. Strictly speaking, 
education of one sort or another will happen, with or without any adult 
involvement, and in many ways and places having nothing to do with 
formal schooling. The subjects traditionally viewed as necessary to 
successful intellectual development (e.g. the three R's, history, science, 
the arts, etc.) can be considered boring by young humans (and some 
adults) and require discipline to learn, so we create schools where these 
elements of education are taught in an organized and measurable 
curriculum. This kind of formal education provides individuals 
intellectual development and the chance for future economic 
opportunity, thus fostering societal stability. 1 The State's concern is that 
the education, which inevitably happens, be of such a quality as to create 
responsible citizens. Therefore, the State provides resources in the form 
of money, facilities, teachers, regulations, etc., designed to ensure this 
result. These governmental provisions constitute public education. 
But is it only governmental self-interest that motivates the existence 
of public education? Or is public education a right belonging to citizens 
who may demand it of the government? Is it a "fundamental right" such 
that it should be supervised and administered by state and federal courts? 
About twenty years ago the U.S. Supreme Court in San Antonio 
Independent School District v. Rodriguez2 refused to recognize a 
fundamental federal right to public education.3 Until recently the point 
seemed closed. However, the Court's recent approach to rights in 
Lawrence v. Texas4 may re-open the debate on the federalleveU State 
courts historically have followed a more flexible approach, often finding a 
1. See Thomas ). Walsh, Education as a Fundamental Right under the United States 
Constitution, 29 Willamette L. Rev. 279 (1993). 
2. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
3. I d. at 2. 
4. 539 U.S. 558 (2003 ). 
5. Id. at 578-79 (For a discussion of the fundamentality of implicit constitutional rights 
using the autonomy approach see infra Section II(C)(i), notes 31-38). 
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fundamental right to public education under state constitutions." 
Both the federal and the state approaches have problems: the hands-
off approach of the federal courts may seem to devalue education, while 
the hands-on approaches of the states may involve too much judicial 
intervention, thus enmeshing the state judiciaries in questions of 
educational and social policy they are not well suited to decide. Much of 
this judicial wrangling over the definition or existence of a fundamental 
right to education deflects attention from the practical concern, i.e. 
whether the federal government or the state governments should fund, 
provide, and superintend public education. After examining the varying 
approaches to this question, this paper concludes that the best approach, 
considering federalism issues, the competencies of the judiciary, and an 
appropriate emphasis on the importance of education, is for the federal 
judiciary to find that there is a right to some basic level of education, and 
for the states to determine and enforce this level. 
Section II of this paper discusses definitions of "public education" 
and "rights," and the basic outlines of constitutional analysis surrounding 
these issues. Section III discusses the early development of U.S. public 
education and how federal courts have dealt with questions regarding a 
right to education, and Section IV outlines the state court approaches 
after Rodriguez. Finally, Section V outlines the possibilities for a 
constitutional basis for a federal right to education, in light of the 
practical questions of which level of government is best suited to make 
educational policy decisions, provide educational resources, and 
otherwise supervise public education. 
II. BASIC DEFINITIONS AND BASIC CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 
"Public education" and "fundamental rights" must be clearly defined 
when discussing whether public education is a federal fundamental or 
constitutional right. The dictionary provides some definitions for these 
terms, but they have become terms of art that only tangentially relate to 
their everyday meaning. The characterization and definitions of these 
rights become critical in constitutional analysis.7 Though all men are 
created equal, not all rights are; only fundamental rights are afforded the 
greatest of constitutional protections. There are two general approaches 
to determine if a right in question is fundamental. The first emphasizes 
the experience of history and tradition, while the second emphasizes the 
6. See infra Section IV. 
7. See infra Section II(B), (C)(i) (discussing constitutional analysis offundamental rights). 
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importance of individual autonomy.8 
A. Public Education 
The traditional American definition of public education is three-fold: 
(l) the government provides an education (2) free to the pupils and (3) 
funded through public money.9 Generally, such public funds come from 
local property taxes as well as state and federal tax revenues. 10 These 
funding issues are the basis of the equal protection litigation in which the 
issue of education as a fundamental interest arises. 11 
The State is not the only provider of education. Private, parochial 
and home schools fulfill individual and societal educational needs. There 
are also other funding structures, such as charter schools or voucher 
systems, which blend the natures of public and private education. 12 
While recognizing the positive addition these venues provide to the 
fabric of the U.S. educational landscape, this paper focuses solely on 
whether creating or defining a federal fundamental right to education is 
proper. In particular, the focus is whether U.S. citizens have the right to 
demand a free education, thereby putting the federal government under a 
duty to provide such. 
B. Fundamental Rights 
A right is something "which is proper under law, morality, or ethics 
[and] ... that is due to a person by just claim, legal guarantee, or moral 
principle." 13 There are several different theories of rights, including 
natural law, positivism, and fundamental rights theories. Each theory 
emphasizes differences in the sources and effects of rights. 
Natural law and positivism are a dichotomous pair in rights theory. 
According to the natural law view, rights and laws derive from the nature 
of the universe and exist independently of our knowledge of them. We 
discover what these rights are through correct reasoning. Natural law 
theory is closely tied to morality. For example, if a law exists which 
8. See infra Section II(C)(i) (discussing history and autonomy approaches in determining 
fundamental rights). 
9. See Stephen R. Goldstein, E. Gordon Gee & Phillip T.K. Daniel, Law and Public Education, 
15 (3d ed., Michie L. Publishers 1995). 
I 0. joseph S. Patt, School Finance Battles: Survey Says? It's All Just a Change in Attitudes, 34 
Harv. C:iv. Rights-Civ. Libs. L. Rev. 547, 551 {1999). 
II. Td. at 547-48. 
12. See Phillip E. johnson, School Vouchers and the United States Constitution, in The School-
Choice Controversy: What is Constitutional, 51, 51-65 (James W. Skillen ed., Baker Books 1993) 
(discussing the constitutionality of voucher systems). 
13. Black's Law Dictionary 1322 (Bryan A. Garnered., 7th ed., West 1999). 
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violates the natural law then it is a wrong law, though it may still be legal. 
A natural right is an ability to act in a particular area. This ability to act is 
inherent in the individual regardless of what anyone else says or does. 
Government is in violation of natural law when it restricts its citizens' 
abilities to act in these areas. Natural rights are not entitlements that 
require government action in order to be realized; rather, the citizens are 
the primary actors and government is to refrain from acting as much as 
possible. 
The Constitution was written in a time when natural law theories 
were dominant, and so the rights enumerated in the Constitution are 
classic examples of natural rights. At that time, government was viewed 
as an oppressor. After all, the Colonies had recently rebelled against the 
"lawful" government of the British Crown. The Constitution and the Bill 
of Rights were therefore set up to divide and limit government power to 
allow people enjoyment of their inalienable rights to life, liberty and 
property. Other natural rights include free speech, free exercise of 
religion, protection from unreasonable searches and seizures, protection 
from self-incrimination, and protection from the government taking 
property without just compensation. The rights enumerated in the 
Constitution are not entitlements provided by the government as much 
as descriptions of the way things ought to be. 
In contrast, positive law theory declares that laws and rights are 
creations of the government, and come from nowhere else. Without 
government action, there is no law or right. 14 Law is a creation of man. 
This theory is therefore somewhat divorced from moral considerations, 
inasmuch as when the government does create a law, its morality or 
immorality does not affect its status as a law. 15 The decision-making 
power and the corresponding ability to act lie with the government, not 
the citizen; the government permits or mandates the citizens to act. 
Under the positivist view of the Constitution, the government is not 
an oppressor, but the provider. The government creates and enforces 
laws and rights that regulate humans so that there is order or happiness 
or justice. These views are generally tied to utilitarian and pragmatic 
principles. Positive rights are those rights that entitle "a person to have 
another [i.e. the government] do some act for the benefit of the person 
entitled."16 Examples of positive rights include welfare rights, social 
security rights, and educational rights. 
14. H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 593, 596 
(1958). 
15. Id. 
16. Black's Law Dictionary, supra n. 13, at 1323. 
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C. Fundamental Rights and Constitutional Analysis under the Fourteenth 
Amendment 
1. History v. Autonomy 
The reason we care whether a right, natural or positive in nature, is 
also a "fundamental" right is because a "fundamental" right is afforded 
great Constitutional protection under the Fourteenth Amendment Due 
Process and Equal Protection Clauses. Fundamental rights analysis is the 
primary means courts use to determine the meaning of the word "liberty" 
in the Fourteenth AmendmentY A fundamental right can be found 
either explicitly or implicitly in the Constitution. The classic fundamental 
rights include those natural rights enumerated in the Constitution, 
including the right to vote. Other fundamental rights, not enumerated 
but considered implicit in the Constitution, include the right to travel, 18 
the right to direct your child's upbringing/9 the right to marry20 and an 
expanding right to privacy,21 which includes the right to bodily 
integrity. 22 There are two chief methods of determining if an implicit 
right in question is fundamental. The first is an historical approach, 
analyzing the history and tradition behind the exercise and effect of the 
right. The second approach is a more open autonomy approach 
exemplified by decisions like Griswolcf3 and, more recently, Lawrence.Z4 
Here the analysis focuses on the importance of the right to the 
individual.25 
Under the first approach, the fundamentalality analysis focuses on 
history and tradition. The word "fundamental" does not carry the 
dictionary definition, but is a term of art. "Fundamental" does not mean 
important, basic or necessary.26 Most rights deemed fundamental are 
usually also important, basic and necessary. However, being important, 
17. The relevant wording of the Fourteenth Amendment is "No State shall ... deprive any 
person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV,§ I. 
18. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489,498 (1999). 
19. Meyer v. Neb., 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923), overruled in part on other grounds, Abbott v. 
Bragdon, 912 F. Supp. 580, 594-595 (D. Me. 1995). 
20. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374,383 (1978); Loving v. Va., 388 U.S. I, 12 (1967). 
21. Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479,485 (1965). 
22. Planned Parenthood ofS.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,847,851 (1992). 
23. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484. Discussed infra this section, note 32. 
24. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578-79. Discussed infra this section, notes 36, 38. 
25. Infra notes 31-38 and accompanying text. 
26. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 30. 
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basic or necessary does not automatically mean a right is fundamental. 27 
For example, food is a critical necessity, but there is no positive right that 
requires the government to provide food for all citizens. 
A fundamental right is primarily a right which is "'deeply rooted in 
this Nation's history and tradition,"'28 and is part of "the very essence of a 
scheme of ordered liberty ... which lie[s] at the base of all of our civil and 
political institutions." 29 The Supreme Court has also required the right in 
question to have been protected.3° For example, being "long recognized 
at common law"31 is one way to show that the right is necessary to a just 
government. Fundamental rights thus appeal to natural law concepts of 
the way things ought to be, while at the same time, by considering history 
and tradition, pay deference to the positive law aspects of that history and 
tradition. 
The second approach to determining the fundamentality of implicit 
constitutional rights involves an inquiry into the importance of the right 
to the autonomy of the individual. In Griswold, the U.S. Supreme Court 
determined that "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have 
penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give 
them life and substance ... creat[ing] zones of privacy."32 In other 
words, the explicit guarantees of the Constitution outline the general 
concepts of the rights to be protected, and the prime right not explicitly 
enumerated but which can be reasonably inferred is the right to privacy, 
or the right to the autonomy of the individual. This reasoning was 
further expanded in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. 
Casey, 33 where the Court stated, "It is a promise of the Constitution that 
there is a realm of personal liberty which the government may not 
enter."34 The Court also stated, "At the heart of liberty is the right to 
define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of 
the mystery of human life."35 The Court explicitly relied on this type of 
27. I d. at 33 ("[T]he central importance of welfare benefits to the poor was not an adequate 
foundation for requiring the State to justifY its law by showing some compelling state interest."). 
28. Wash. v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 
431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality)). See also Reno v Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 303 (1 993) (Fundamental 
liberty interests must be "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as 
fundamental." (internal quotations marks and citations omitted)). 
29. Palko v. Conn., 302 U.S. 319, 325, 328 (1937) (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted), overruled on other grounds, Benton v. Md., 395 U.S. 784, 794 ( 1969). 
30. Michael H. v. GeraldD.,491 U.S.l!O, 122 (1989). 
31. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399. 
32. 381 U.S. at 484. 
33. 505 U.S. 833. 
34. !d. at 847. 
35. I d. at 851. 
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reasoning when invalidating Texas's law against homosexual sodomy in 
Lawrence: 
Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth 
Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment known the components of 
liberty in its manifold possibilities, they might have been more specific. 
They did not presume to have this insight. They knew times can blind 
us to certain truths and later generations can see that laws once thought 
necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress. As the Constitution 
endures, persons in every generation can invoke its principles in their 
own search for greater freedom.36 
This sort of analysis protects constitutional liberties that are important to 
the individual determination of freedom. This current approach is more 
flexible in determining what a fundamental right is. History may provide 
a context, but the most relevant context is the present. 37 In fact, the 
Court specifically rejected a historical approach in Lawrence, stating that 
the "laws and traditions in the past half century are most relevant"38 in 
determining the nature of a fundamental right. 
2. Flexibility v. Stability 
There is particular difficulty when the judiciary interprets social 
issues involving important rights that are determined to be fundamental. 
Important social issues tempt justices to base decisions on extra-
constitutional considerations, inviting unpredictable interpretations of 
the defining document of our nation. The Court gets involved in 
enacting "Herbert Spencer's Social Sta[ tis] tics."39 Constitutional 
interpretation becomes unpredictable and almost legislative. 40 Worse, if 
the Court gets it wrong, the only way to fix it is with a Constitutional 
amendment or by the infrequent occurrence of the Court overruling 
itself. 
36. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578-579. 
37. Id. at 571-72. 
38. Id. 
39. Lochner v. N.Y .. 198 U.S. 45,75 (1905). (Holmes, J., dissenting), overruled, Honeywell, Inc. 
v. Minn. Life & Health Ins. Guaranty Assn., 110 F.3d 547, 554 (8th Cir. 1997) ("Cases of that era 
frequently invalidated statutes that limited economic autonomy in a manner thought by the Court to 
be unnecessary or unwise, but in more recent decisions, the Court plainly sees its role differently."); 
and overruled, Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963) ("The doctrine that prevailed in 
Lochner . .. that due process authorizes courts to hold laws unconstitutional when they believe the 
legislature has acted unwisely-has long since been discarded."). But see Planned Parenthood of S.E. 
Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846-47 (1992) (The Court states that the "privacy" and "liberty" analyses 
are the substantive due process analysis purportedly discarded by Ferguson.) 
40. Honeywell, 110 F. 3d at 554 ("'We do not sit as a super legislature to weigh the wisdom of 
legislation nor to decide whether the policy which it expresses offends the public welfare."' (quoting 
Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Mo., 342 U.S. 421,423, {1952))). 
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The Constitution should be a predictable guide for government 
action. The definition of the various constitutional rights becomes 
significant in determining the stability of constitutional interpretation 
over time. Courts can act with confidence in areas that have been well 
trod. But the newer, less well-defined aspects of a case presented to a 
court should invite caution in judicial action. It takes time and 
experimentation to see how certain rights affect political, social, 
economic, familial, individual and legal aspects of society. 
Thus, there is an ongoing tension between the need for constitutional 
stability on one hand and flexibility on the other. An easily amended 
constitution becomes unpredictable and looses the authority of history 
and tradition. Rather than being something by which to measure state 
action, a too-malleable constitution makes state action a high-stakes 
gamble. Consequently, to protect the stability and integrity of the 
Constitution, the amending procedures built into it are extremely 
difficult and make it unlikely for any amendment to pass. On the other 
hand, a constitution should not be a straightjacket, imprisoning the 
future with restrictions from the past. It should be flexible and adaptable 
to the times. 
This difficult balancing act of stability and flexibility was 
demonstrated in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections.41 At one point 
Justice Douglas stated, "In determining what lines are unconstitutionally 
discriminatory, we have never been confined to historic notions of 
equality, any more than we have restricted due process to a fixed 
catalogue of what was at a given time deemed to be the limits of 
fundamental rights."42 This statement implies that the requirements of 
both due process and equal protection will change over time. On the next 
page Justice Douglas declared that the Court's conclusion "is founded not 
on what we think governmental policy should be, but on what the Equal 
Protection Clause requires."43 This implies a built-in stability to the 
interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause. But if the Court is the only 
determiner of the changing meaning of the Equal Protection Clause, how 
can any interpretation be based on anything other than what the Court 
thinks governmental policy should be? 
In his dissent, Justice Harlan pointed out the unsuitability of too 
41. 383 U.S. 663 (1966). Harperforms part of the background for subsequent federal and state 
educational funding cases. Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1250 (Cal. 1971), superseded on other 
grounds, Crawford v. Huntington Beach Union High Sch. Dist., 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 487 P.2d at 1249 
(App. 4th Dist. 2002); Rodriquez v. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280, 282-83 (W.D. 
Tex. 1971) [hereinafter Rodriguez II]. 
42. Harper, 383 U.S. at 669. 
43. I d. at 670. 
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much judicial flexibility in constitutional analysis: 
It is of course entirely fitting that legislatures should modify the law to 
reflect such changes in popular attitudes. However, it is all wrong, in 
my view, for the Court to adopt the political doctrines popularly 
accepted at a particular moment of our history and to declare all others 
to be irrational and invidious, barring them from the range of choice by 
reasonably minded people acting through the political process.44 
269 
Political processes are better fitted to determine issues upon which 
reasonable people can reasonably disagree. If an outcome is inadequate, a 
majority of the people can change the outcome to better fit the needs of 
the time; the issue is not elevated to the level of constitutional debate, and 
yet it is satisfactorily handled. On the other hand, if the Supreme Court 
makes a determination of such a highly debatable Issue on ostensibly 
constitutional principles, the outcome of which is insufficient, unless the 
justices overturn themselves, only a supermajority of the people, through 
a constitutional amendment, can remedy the situation.45 
3. Levels of Constitutional Analysis 
Because of the need to limit judges and send questions of legislative 
importance to the political branches, courts have generally required a 
showing that a right is fundamental, or that a suspect classification is 
being used, before strictly scrutinizing a governmental action. Rights that 
are not fundamental are subject to a lesser standard of scrutiny. The idea 
behind these differing levels of scrutiny is that the judiciary should 
involve itself only in matters where the individual right is such that it 
would be a grave injustice for the majoritarian process to violate that 
right. 46 If the right is fundamental, it is critical that the courts be able to 
counter the will of the majority to protect the individual. Strict scrutiny is 
also applied if the government uses a suspect classification, such as race 
or gender.47 
Strict scrutiny requires that the regulation in question have a 
compelling governmental interest as its end goal, and that the means 
44. I d. at 686 (Harlan & Stewart, Jj., dissenting). 
45. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 133, 178 (1803) ("So if a law be in opposition to the 
constitution; if both the law and the constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court must 
either decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the 
constitution, disregarding the law; the court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs 
the case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty. If then the courts are to regard the constitution; 
and the constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature; the constitution, and not such 
ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply.") 
46. Mugler v. Kan., 123 U.S. 623,622 (1887). 
47. See Strauder v. W. Va., 100 U.S. 303,307 (1879); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71,75 (1971). 
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used to achieve that end are narrowly tailored to accomplish it.48 Narrow 
tailoring means that the methods used must be necessary to the 
accomplishment of the objective and there must not be any less 
restrictive means possible to attain the end.49 In other words, there must 
be a tight fit between the means and the end. The government carries a 
substantial burden in proving a tight fit between the means and the end. 
In practice, the "necessary" prong of the strict scrutiny analysis can kill 
almost any regulation because there are very few things that are 
absolutely necessary to accomplish any goal. 5° There is always more than 
one way to skin a cat. Thus, strict scrutiny is frequently lethal to a 
governmental regulation. 
Rational basis scrutiny, on the other hand, only requires that the 
regulation be in furtherance of a legitimate, as opposed to compelling, 
state interest, and that the means used are rationally related to the end 
sought. 51 These two requirements are relatively easy for the government 
to satisfy. Generally, if a regulation of a right is subject to rational basis 
scrutiny, in all likelihood the regulation will survive. The person 
challenging the governmental action carries the burden of disproving the 
rationality of the action. 52 
The consequence of identifying public education as a constitutionally 
protected fundamental right is that any regulation of public education 
would be subject to strict judicial scrutiny. The government, on both 
state and federal levels, would be required each time to show that every 
action taken regarding public education is necessary to accomplish the 
goal of education. This leads to competing difficulties. First, it would 
require the federal government to provide for and finance public 
education, leading to many economic and social repercussions. Second, 
combining the amorphous process of education with the stringent 
requirements of strict scrutiny could hamstring the government's ability 
48. See e.g. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 643 (1993) ("Accordingly, we have held that the 
Fourteenth Amendment requires state legislation that expressly distinguishes among citizens because 
of their race to be narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest."). 
49. Wash. v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721. 
50. Gerald Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: a Model for a Newer 
Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 8 (1972) ("The Warren Court embraced a rigid two-tiered 
attitude .... [Strict scrutiny] was 'strict' in theory and fatal in fact."). 
51. See e.g. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 224 (1982) ("[T]he ... [statute] can hardly be 
considered rational unless it furthers some substantial goal of the State."). 
52. This description of a two-tiered system of judicial scrutiny oversimplifies the current 
Supreme Court jurisprudence. In certain areas, such as gender discrimination, age discrimination 
and sexual orientation, the Court does not adhere clearly to one standard or the other. Rather it 
applies some form of mid-tier scrutiny. 
See e.g. Norman T. Deutsch, Nguyan v. INS and the Application of Intermediate Scrutiny to Gender 
Classifications: Theory, Practice, and Reality, 30 Pepp. L. Rev. 185, 186 (2003). 
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to provide education, and convert the judiciary into school 
administrators. 
III. EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF PUBLIC EDUCATION AND THE FEDERAL 
TREATMENT OF EDUCATIONAL RIGHTS 
From the beginning, America's leaders have stressed education's 
importance. Thomas Jefferson drafted a plan by which the poor in 
Virginia could receive the benefits of education. He stated, 
Every government degenerates when trusted to the rulers of the people 
alone. The people themselves therefore are its only safe depositories. 
And to render even them safe, their minds must be improved to a 
certain degree. This indeed is not all that is necessary, though it be 
essentially necessary. An amendment of our [state] constitution must 
here come in aid of the public education. 53 
The purpose behind the schooling was to protect democratic 
government. Jefferson also envisioned public education as a means of 
socio-economic redistribution, benefiting not just the nation's political 
health but also its social and economic aspects, as well as a means for 
providing for individual improvement. 54 
However, the federal government felt no compulsion to mandate 
education, and though state constitutions contained clauses requiring 
education for children, compulsory attendance was not a law. 55 In 1852, 
Massachusetts was the first state to pass compulsory school attendance 
laws.56 Families were primarily responsible for the education of their 
children. Families with sufficient resources would send their children to 
private schools or tutor them at home. 57 Poor families could send their 
children to government-sponsored schools, but attendance was not 
mandatory. 58 In other words, decision-making power concerning a 
child's education rested with the family. This concept is behind the 
holdings in Meyer v. Nebraska 59 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters. 60 
However, as compulsory school attendance laws became universal, 
53. Thomas jefferson, The Works of Thomas Jefferson val. 4, 64 (Paul Leicester Ford, ed., fed. 
ed., G.P. Putnam's Sons 1904)). 
54. I d.; Goldstein, supra n. 9 at 8. 
55. Mark). Yudof et al., Educational Policy and the Law I (4th ed., West 2002). 
56. Daniel ). Rose, Compulsory Education and Parent Rights: A Judicial Framework of 
Analysis, 30 B.C. L. Rev. 861,868 (1989). 
57. Yudof, supra n. 55, at 2. 
58. Id. at I. 
59. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401. Discussed infra, this section, notes 75-78. 
60. 268 U.S. 510,532 (1925). Discussed infra this section, notes 80-85. 
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making education look more like a positive right, the decision-making 
power shifted. For example, the presumption in Wisconsin v. Yoder'>~ was 
enough against the parents' right to choose their child's education that 
the holding had to be extremely narrow to apply practically only to the 
Amish.62 
This concept of publicly funded compulsory education is relatively 
new- approximately one hundred years old.63 During the entire course 
of this history, the states, and more precisely, the local school districts, 
have been primarily responsible for funding education. States have also 
been primarily responsible for making educational policy decisions. 
Because of the newness of compulsory education and because of the 
traditional competency of the states in handling education, it would be a 
departure from historical analysis for a court to declare a federal 
fundamental right to education. 
Until recently, Congress has had little or nothing to do with the vast 
majority of educational issues. This is largely due to constitutional 
restrictions on the federal government's ability to act. The federal 
government cannot act without authority explicitly granted to it by the 
Constitution, and nothing in the Constitution explicitly delegates 
educational authority to the federal government. 
However, Congress is no stranger to educational policy issues and 
such previous involvement may justify the creation of a federal right to 
public education. Congress has shaped public education through the 
authority of other provisions of the Constitution, such as the Spending 
Clause64 and the Commerce Clause.65 One hefty federal educational 
directive is the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).66 
Congress mandated significant state action to equalize educational 
61. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
62. Stephen G. Gilles, On Educating Children: A Parentalist Manifesto, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 937, 
992-93 (1996). 
63. Rose, supra n. 56, at 868. It was not until 1983 that all fifty states and the District of 
Columbia had compulsory education laws. I d. 
64. Susan H. Bitensky, Theoretical Foundations for a Right to Education under the U.S. 
Constitution: A Beginning to the End of the National Education Crisis, 86 Nw. U. L. Rev. 550, 631 
(1992). 
65. However, Congress's ability to use the commerce clause as a means to regulate public 
schools was effectively halted by U.S. v. Lopez, where the link between interstate commerce and gun 
control at schools was too attenuated to allow Congress to pass a Gun-Free School Zones Act. 514 
U.S. 549,567-68 (1995), superseded, U.S. v. Tucker, 90 F.3d 1135, 1140 (6th Cir. 1996) ("The [Lopez] 
Court's decision also relied on the absence of a jurisdictional element in the statute and the lack of 
relevant congressional findings. While Lopez was pending review in the Supreme Court, Congress 
amended [the statute] to include such findings." (internal footnotes omitted)). 
66. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq. (2000). 
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opportunity for the disabledY This action was done under the authority 
of the Spending Clause,68 yet is largely unfunded.69 The IDEA creates a 
positive federal fundamental right to public education, but only for those 
who are disabled. Other examples of federal intervention in state public 
education include desegregation requirements/0 and First Amendment 
requirements of free speech, and free exercise and non-establishment of 
religion. 71 Currently, the federal government is making a significant 
foray into the educational policy sphere under the No Child Left Behind 
Act (NCLB). 72 The actions together could serve as a justification for 
establishing a federal fundamental right to public education, whether 
under an historical or flexible-autonomy approach. 
Some version of a right to education has long been recognized by the 
Supreme Court. 73 Generally this right has been characterized as a natural 
right held by parents to direct the upbringing and education of their 
children. This means that traditionally, the responsibility and decision-
making power for a child's education rested in the first instance with the 
parent. It was not until the spread of compulsory education laws in the 
early twentieth century that the assumption of responsibility began to 
shift towards the state.74 
One of the earliest cases in which the Supreme Court dealt with a 
right to education is Meyer v. Nebraska?5 The Court struck down a 
statute that prohibited teaching foreign languages before the eighth 
grade.76 The State's interest in acculturating its citizens did not outweigh 
67. David Stewart, Expanding Remedies for IDEA Violations, 31 [.L. & Educ. 373,377 (2002). 
68. Id. at 376-77. 
69. Only approximately eight percent of IDEA mandates are paid for from Federal coffers. 
The rest must be provided by the State. See 143 Cong. Rec. S4356 (daily ed. May 13, 1997) (statement 
of Sen. Gorton). 
70. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), affd, 349 U.S. 294 (1955); Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. l, 30 (1971) (bussing students a permissible remedy for creating 
unitary school districts). 
71. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 596-97 (1987) (Act requiring balanced treatment 
between evolution and creationism was an establishment of religion in violation of the l'irst 
Amendment); Wallace v. ]ajfree, 472 U.S. 38, 41-42, 61 (1985) (Daily period of silence in public 
schools for meditation or voluntary prayer was an endorsement of religion in violation of the First 
Amendment); W. Va. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (students with religious objections not 
required to salute the flag). 
72. 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301 et seq. (2000). 
73. See Meyer, 252 U.S. 390, Brown, 347 U.S. 483, Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1. 
74. Rose, supra n. 56, at 867. 
75. 262 U.S. 390. 
76. Id. at 399 (explaining that "liberty ... denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint 
but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to 
acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God 
according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long 
recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men"). This case 
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the combined interests of parents in directing the education of their 
children, teachers in pursuing their professions, and children in 
acquiring knowledge. 77 The Court hinted at the fundamentality of these 
educational rights by stating "the individual has certain fundamental 
rights which must be respected."78 However, the case was decided under 
rational basis scrutiny and failed to establish conclusively that either 
parents or students hold a fundamental right to public education.79 
The next landmark case in which the Court considered educational 
rights was Pierce. 80 In Pierce, the Court struck down a statute requiring 
that all students attend public schools. 81 Creating such a duty on the 
government would also create the commensurate right to demand public 
education. 82 The statute was struck down under rational basis scrutiny 
based explicitly on the reasoning in Meyer. 83 The Court's language 
strongly stated that the State could not constitutionally compel students 
to attend public schools, and that to do so violated the parents' right to 
direct their children's education.84 As in Meyer, the right to education 
was not considered to be held by students alone, but rather is a right held 
jointly by parents and teachers.85 Consequently, the case does not answer 
the question of whether students could demand a public education from 
the State. 
Brown v. Board of Education86 is a milestone in the history of 
constitutional law. In this case, Justice Warren used sweeping language to 
describe what public education is: 
[E]ducation is perhaps the most important function of state and local 
forms part of the background for expanding the definitions of "liberty" and "privacy" beyond what is 
explicitly written in the Constitution. 
77. I d. at 401. 
78. Id. 
79. I d. at 403. 
80. 268 U.S. 510. 
81. Id. at 530, 534-35. 
82. See e.g. McDuffy v. Sec. of the Exec. Off of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 519 (Mass. 1993) 
(holding that a legal duty exists under the Massachusetts Constitution to provide an adequate public 
education). 
83. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. at 532, 534-35. However, the fundamentality of the parents' right to direct their 
children's education has been undermined by recent cases involving home schooling and 
compulsory attendance laws. See Null v. Bd. of Educ. of County of Jackson, 815 F. Supp. 937, 939 
(S.D.W. Va. 1993) (Parents, though they have an interest, have no fundamental right to home school 
children such that strict scrutiny is invoked when the parents challenge a law that removes students 
from home schools if the students did not adequately pass a standardized test.); Hanson v. Cushman, 
490 F. Supp. 109, 114 (W.D. Mich. 1980) (Parents' interest in directing their children's education is 
not a fundamental right which invokes strict scrutiny.). 
86. 347 u.s. 483. 
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governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great 
expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the 
importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the 
performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in 
the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it 
is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in 
preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to 
adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that 
any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied 
the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state 
has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to 
all on equal terms.87 
275 
However, the question in this case was race-based classification, not the 
nature of a right to education.88 Furthermore, equal protection analysis is 
inherently relative. Brown can only mean that when a state chooses to act 
by providing education, it must provide it on equal terms. 89 This does 
not actually require a state to provide public education, and therefore 
does not establish a fundamental right to public education. 
More recently the question of whether public education is a 
fundamental right has come up largely under equal protection analyses of 
state funding schemes. The background of these equal protection cases 
begins with a voting rights case, Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections.90 
This case is important in at least two aspects relevant to the subsequent 
educational funding cases: the reasoning used to establish first, the 
fundamental right to vote,91 and second, that wealth may be a suspect 
classification.92 
In Harper, a poll tax was held unconstitutional as violating a citizen's 
fundamental right to vote.93 The right to vote was held to be 
fundamental because it is "preservative of other basic civil and political 
rights"94 Without the right to vote, a person not only would be denied 
first amendment rights of expression in the political arena, but also 
would lose the ability to use political processes to protect other rights.95 
87. I d. at 493. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. ("Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which 
must be made available to all on equal terms."). 
90. 383 u.s. 663. 
91. I d. at 667. 
92. Id. at 668 ("Wealth, like race, creed, or color, is not germane to one's ability to participate 
intelligently in the electoral process. Lines drawn on the basis of wealth . . . are traditionally 
disfavored.") 
93. Id. 
94. Id. at 667 (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,561-62 (1964)). 
95. See id. 
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Perhaps the Court's most unique and difficult holding is that wealth 
is a suspect classification which states are not justified using in relation to 
fundamental rights.96 However, wealth classifications are necessarily 
used in determining such things as welfare benefits and taxes. Subjecting 
a state to strict scrutiny in making these decisions could hamstring its 
ability to act at all, involving courts in the details of administering areas 
that they are ill-equipped to handle.97 
However, these fears are unlikely to be realized soon. The Court has 
backed away from strict scrutiny of economic issues, including wealth 
classifications,98 and has also curtailed considering government 
entitlements as liberty or property interests.99 However, it appears that 
this change in reasoning is based more on practicality than on 
constitutional analysis. If providing welfare benefits were required due to 
a fundamental liberty or property right classification, the State would be 
severely strained providing for what could become a flood of demands on 
its resources. If there is not a limit to what is considered a fundamental 
right, individual property interests and majority democratic rule would 
fall to pieces. Shades of Marxism and communism dance in the shadows 
of ever-expanding fundamental rights. 
It is important to note several distinctions between Harper and the 
educational funding cases that follow. Harper deals with a unique state 
power to tax, and a well-established inherent right that only the 
government has to tax. 10° Furthermore, U.S. citizens have long held the 
franchise to vote. 101 The question in Harper was not the existence of a 
fundamental right to vote, 102 rather, the question was whether state action 
inhibited the ability of citizens to exercise the already established right to 
vote. 103 In contrast, education is not a uniquely state prerogative and 
states rarely act to prohibit access to education. 104 
96. !d. at 668. 
97. Infra nn. 160-164 (discussing the problems with classifying education as a fundamental 
right). 
98. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970) ("'tis enough that the State's action be 
rationally based."). 
99. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976); Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577-78 
(1972) (concepts of liberty and property interests severely limited when determining the extent of 
procedural due process required). 
100. Harper, 383 U.S. at 666. 
101. I d. at 667 (referring to "'the political franchise of voting,"' Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 
356, 370 ( 1886). 
102. Id. 
103. I d. at 668. 
104. There have been school districts which closed down in an effort to remain racially 
segregated. However, Courts required the districts to re-open, in as much as such action was illegally 
discriminatory. See A. E. Dick Howard, Commentaries on the Constitution of Virginia vol. 2, 883-84 
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Another important distinction between Harper and subsequent 
public education cases is that the right to vote is purely political and is 
inherent in a democratic government. The right to vote demands nothing 
more of the government except that a democracy exist. 105 In contrast, 
public education would not exist without significant state resource input. 
Furthermore, it is difficult to delineate a right to public education as a 
political right, civil right or human right. It is an amalgamation of them 
all. 
A. Serrano v. Priest 
This case, though a state court case, forms the background for the 
Supreme Court's decision in Rodriguez. 106 In Serrano v. Priest, 107 the 
California Supreme Court decided under an equal protection analysis 
that California's public school financing provisiOns were 
unconstitutional. 108 In the process, it declared that public education was 
a fundamental right109 and that wealth is a suspect classification. 110 
At the time in California, there were two major sources of funding: 
the local property taxes (providing the majority of the funds) and aid 
from the State School Fund. 111 The total raw dollar amount available for 
education could be significantly more in property-rich districts than in 
property-poor districts, even if the rich districts tax at a significantly 
lower rate. 112 
Parents in a property poor district of Los Angeles brought a class 
action suit, representing "all public school pupils in California, 'except 
children in that school district, the identity of which is presently 
unknown, which school district affords the greatest educational 
opportunity of all school districts within California."'113 The listing of the 
members of this class shows that the plaintiffs weren't seeking merely 
(U. Press ofVa. 1974). 
I 05. And the ability to interpret various forms of chads. 
106. 411 U.S. at 18-19 n. 48. 
107. 487 P.2d 1241. 
108. Jd. at 1263. 
109. Jd. at 1258. 
110. Jd. at 1250. 
Ill. Jd. at 1246. 
112. Jd. It is interesting to note the assumption that putting more money into education is 
some sort of guarantee that the education will be better. In broad outlines this may be true, but 
throwing more money at an issue is no hard guarantee of improving any particular problem. 
Furthermore, an area's income per family is not necessarily the only determiner of the tax base. 
Industrial areas surrounded by neighborhoods of the lower socio-economic strata can have a 
significant tax base by virtue of the tax levied on the industrial property. 
113. !d. at 1244. 
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that the State fulfill some basement definition of an adequate education. 
They were demanding that the State provide the best possible education 
to all students by equalizing and maximizing state funding of education. 
The court held that the financing system based upon local property 
taxes was not necessary to accomplish a compelling state interest. 114 
While the court decided the issue using strict scrutiny, the court 
acknowledged that the contention that education is "a fundamental 
interest which may not be conditioned on wealth" was without direct 
support. 115 The only support was tangential: dicta in Shapiro v. 
Thompson 116 indicated that wealth discrimination in public education 
would be unconstitutional. 117 Also, the Fifth Circuit had considered the 
issue of whether public education is a fundamental right, but avoided 
defining education as a fundamental right by deciding the matters under 
rational basis scrutiny. 118 
There are further difficulties not noted by this court in striking down 
such a funding scheme as a violation of equal protection. One is that 
there must be purposeful discrimination in order to violate equal 
protection. 119 However, because the local property tax system has been 
used almost universally to fund public education, 120 such purposeful 
discrimination is hard to prove. 
After noting the "twin themes of the importance of education to the 
individual and to society," 121 the court listed five reasons why education 
is a fundamental right. First, education is "essential in maintaining ... 
'free enterprise democracy' -that is, preserving an individual's 
opportunity to compete successfully in the economic marketplace, despite 
114. Id. at 1263. 
115. Id. at 1255. 
116. 394 U.S. 618 (1969), overruled in part, Payne v. Tenn., 501 U.S. 808, 827 {1991) (The 
Supreme Court reversed its prior holding regarding "the admission of victim impact evidence and 
prosecutorial argument on that subject," which is not discussed in this paper.). 
117. Serrano, 487 P.2d at 1255 (quoting Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 633) ("We recognize that a State 
has a valid interest in preserving the fiscal integrity of its programs. It may legitimately attempt to 
limit its expenditures, whether for public assistance, public education, or any other program. But a 
State may not accomplish such a purpose by invidious distinctions between classes of its citizens. It 
could not, for example, reduce expenditures for education by barring indigent children from its 
schools."). 
118. Hargrave v. McKinney, 413 F.2d 320, 324 (5th Cir. 1969) ("The equal protection argument 
advanced by plaintiffs is the crux of the case. Noting that lines drawn on wealth are suspect and that 
we are here dealing with interests which may well be deemed fundamental, we cannot say that there 
is no reasonably arguable theory of equal protection which would support a decision in favor of the 
plaintiffs" (internal citations omitted)). 
119. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,240 (1976). 
120. Patt, supra n. 10, at 551. 
121. Serrano, 487 P.2d at 1257. 
261] PUBLIC EDUCATION 279 
a disadvantaged background." 122 This hearkens back to the reasoning 
from Harper: the right to education is preservative of other rights. 123 
The second, third, and fourth reasons why the court considered 
education as a fundamental interest all deal with the depth and breadth 
of education's effect on each individual in society. These reasons hearken 
back to the U.S. Supreme Court's language in Brown. 124 Each reason 
compared education with other government services, such as welfare, fire 
and police protection, and garbage collection. 125 The second reason was 
that everyone benefits from education. 126 Third, public education occurs 
over a continuous span of ten to thirteen years. 127 The fourth reason was 
that education "is unmatched in the extent to which it molds the 
personality of the youth of society."128 In contrast to these reasons, other 
government services may not be called upon by citizens, are intermittent 
in their operation, and are "essentially neutral in their effect on the 
individual psyche."129 
Finally, the court determined that education was a fundamental 
interest because the State had made attendance compulsory. 130 
Furthermore, the compulsoriness was not limited to just requiring 
attendance at any school: a student must attend a particular district or 
school, unless the family has the resources to send the student to a 
private school. 131 This made poorer students take on '"the complexion 
of ... prisoner[s], complete with a minimum sentence of 12 years."' 132 
The State attempted to show that using local property taxes is 
narrowly tailored to the goal of educating children, claiming that local 
property taxes promoted a compelling interest in promoting local control 
of public education. 133 The court rejected this on two grounds. First, 
decision-making power could still lie with the districts, regardless of the 
funding scheme. 134 Second, local control means little if limited tax 
resources means limited educational choice. As the court put it, "So long 
122. /d. at 1258-59 (emphasis added). 
123. See Harper, 383 U.S. at 667. 
124. Brown, 347 U.S. at 493. 







132. Id. at 1259 (quoting john E. Coons et al., Educational Opportunity: A Workable 
Constitutional Test of State Financial Structures 57 Cal. L. Rev. 305,388 (1969)). 
133. Id. at 1260. 
134. /d. 
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as the assessed valuation within a district's boundaries is a major 
determinant of how much it can spend for its schools, only a district with 
a large tax base will be truly able to decide how much it really cares about 
education."135 
And so the court required the State to equalize all funds across the 
State assuming the result would be increased funding from the State's 
deep pocket.136 However, centralizing school financing through judicial 
decree reduces property owners' incentives to pay for public schooling 
and limits legislative ability to appropriately respond to public demand 
for decreased taxes. 137 After Serrano took effect, the California 
Legislature was faced with a tax reduction measure known as Proposition 
13, which had the effect of reducing educational funding statewide. The 
legislature was effectively restricted from acting to protect educational 
spending when taxpayers were demanding a reduction in total 
spending. 138 Ultimately, this led to "starv[ation of] the public sector, 
[with] school funding [as a] major victim."139 In contrast, when local 
property taxes support schools, taxpayers self-interest in the 
"capitalization of the benefits of education into individual property 
values makes it rational for . . . [everyone] to offer support for 
education."140 
Note the shift in the assumption of who holds the decision-making 
power. In the previous education cases, the parents were the primary 
decision makers. The right in question was clearly the parents' right to 
direct their child's education. In this case, the right in question is not as 
clear. It seems to be more of an amalgamation of a child's right to be 
educated in some manner, and the state's responsibility to provide that 
education. Parents are calling upon the state to act, rather than 
petitioning for the state to stop acting. Rather than the parents making a 
decision that directly affects their child, the parents are affecting their 
children indirectly through the agency of the state. The state's power over 
children is actually increased, for good or ill. 
B. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez 
In Rodriguez, the U.S. Supreme Court was faced with a factual 
situation similar to that in Serrano, and reached a decidedly different 
135. Id. 
136. William A. Fischel, How Serrano Caused Proposition 13, 12 j.L. & Pol. 607,619 (1996). 
137. See id. 
138. Id. at 608-609. 
139. Id. at 609. 
140. Id. at 620. 
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outcome. 141 The Rodriguez Court unequivocally determined that public 
education is not a federal fundamental right. 142 
Just as in California, public school funds in San Antonio came largely 
from local property taxes and a supplementary state fund. 143 Plaintiffs 
were from Edgewood Independent School District, whose average 
assessed property value per pupil was the lowest in San Antonio, 
$5,960. 144 In comparison, the Alamo Heights Independent School 
District, the most affluent district in the metropolitan area, had an 
assessed property value per pupil of more than $49,000. 145 Despite Texas' 
efforts to equalize educational funding, there was still a $238-per-pupil 
difference in expenditures.146 To worsen the rub of the disparity, the 
taxpayers in the poor Edgewood District paid an equalized tax rate of 
$1.05 per $100 of assessed property, as opposed to only $.85 per $100 in 
Alamo Heights. 147 
Based on reasoning from Harper and Serrano, the Federal District 
Court found that the dual system of financing public schools violated the 
Equal Protection Clause. 148 The Supreme Court rejected Harper149 and 
Serrano 150 as controlling precedent. Harper dealt with restrictions on the 
right to vote, not with disparities in disbursement of government 
entitlements. 151 Furthermore, there was no clearly defined class of people 
in Rodriguez who could be considered discriminated against on the basis 
of wealth. 152 It could have been people who fell below some specific level 
of poverty, or people who were generally more poor than others, or those 
who lived in a poor district, regardless of their actual income. 153 Justice 
Powell pointed out that the "relative-rather than absolute-nature of 
141. 411 U.S. 1. 
142. I d. at 35. 
143. Id. at 9-10. Federal funds were also available, but did not amount to enough to be 
considered as significantly ameliorating the disparities. I d. at 12 n. 32. 
144. Id. at 12. 
145. Id. 
146. Id. at 13. 
147. Id. at 12-13. 
148. Id. at 16 ("Finding that wealth is a "suspect" classification ... , the District Court held that 
the Texas system could be sustained only if the State could show that it was premised upon some 
compelling state interest."). "Serrano convincingly analyzes discussions regarding the suspect nature 
of classifications based on wealth." Rodriguez II, 337 F. Supp. at 281. "Among the authorities relied 
upon to support the ... conclusion 'that lines drawn on wealth are suspect' is Harper." Id. at 282 
(quoting Harper, 383 U.S. at 668). 
149. Id. at 18. 
150. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 18-19. 
151. Id. at 34-36. 
152. Id. at 19. 
153. Id. at 19-20. 
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the asserted deprivation is of significant consequence." 154 The plaintiffs 
were claiming a deprivation, not because the State was actually depriving, 
but because it was giving more to one group than to another. 155 The 
Court found that the relativity of this argument undercut its strength, 
particularly as no one claimed that any students were actually being 
deprived of an education. 156 
This was an unexpected position for an equal protection analysis 
because equal protection concepts are inherently relative. Justice 
Marshall in his dissent pointed this out: "The Equal Protection Clause is 
not addressed to the minimal sufficiency but rather to the unjustifiable 
inequalities of state action. It mandates nothing less than that 'all persons 
similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike."' 157 
However, because of "the absence of any evidence that the financing 
system discriminates against any definable category of 'poor' people or 
that it results in the absolute deprivation of education," 158 and because 
"[t]he system of alleged discrimination and the class it defines have none 
of the traditional indicia of suspectness," the Court did not apply strict 
scrutiny. 159 
The Court then went on to consider whether education is a 
fundamental right, using the classic historical approach. After noting the 
undeniable importance of education, Justice Powell noted "the 
importance of a service performed by the State does not determine 
whether it must be regarded as fundamental for purposes of examination 
under the Equal Protection Clause." 16° Conceivably every State action 
could have an important effect on citizens. Courts should not make "ad 
hoc determination[s] as to the social or economic importance" of a 
right. 161 If a court's determination of "importance" were the only criteria 
on which to determine whether the right affected is a constitutional or 
fundamental right, then nearly all State action would be subject to strict 
judicial scrutiny, turning the judiciary into a "'super-legislature. "' 162 
154. !d. at 19. 
155. Id. at 15. 
156. ld. at25,36-37. 
157. ld. at 89 (Marshall,). dissenting) (quoting F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Va., 253 U.S. 412, 415 
(1920)). 
158. Id. at 25. 
159. I d. at 28. The traditional indicia of a suspect classification which plaintiffs lacked are, "the 
class is not saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal 
treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary 
protection from the majoritarian political process." Id. 
160. I d. at 30. 
161. Id. at 32. 
162. I d. at 31 (quoting Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 655 (Harlan,)., dissenting)). 
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Rather, equal protection analysis must be limited to those rights that are 
established either explicitly or implicitly in the Constitution. 163 As Justice 
Powell pointed out, "It is not the province of this Court to create 
substantive constitutional rights in the name of guaranteeing equal 
protection of the laws." 164 Even though food, shelter, clothing and a job 
are all extremely important, the courts have refused to depart from 
normal modes of analysis of legislative classifications involving socio-
economic questions. 165 
The Court stated that the question of whether education is a 
fundamental right could only be answered by determining if it is a right 
"explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution."166 Obviously, 
there is nothing about education explicit in the Constitution. An 
argument can be made that education becomes a "fundamental political 
right" implicit in the Constitution as it is "preservative of all rights." 167 
The appellees in Rodriguez reasoned that without proper education, 
citizens are unable to meaningfully participate in the political process. 168 
They argued that there is a "nexus between speech and education" and 
that without the ability to effectively communicate with others, the right 
to free speech is meaningless. 169 Furthermore, if a person is uneducated, 
their right to vote is not likely to benefit either that person or society in 
general. 170 The Court rejected these arguments, stating that it 
[has] never presumed to possess either the ability or the authority to 
guarantee to the citizenry the most effective speech or the most 
informed electoral choice. That these may be desirable goals of a system 
of freedom of expression and of a representative form of government is 
not to be doubted. These are indeed goals to be pursued by a people 
whose thoughts and beliefs are freed from governmental interference. 
163. I d. at 33. 
164. Id. 
165. ]ejferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 546 (1972) ("So long as [the State's] judgments are 
rational, and not invidious, the legislature's efforts to tackle the problems of the poor and the needy 
are not subject to a constitutional straitjacket."); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 81 (1971) 
(applying rational basis scrutiny for "a statutory classification in the area of social welfare"); Goldberg 
v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970) (Court did not apply strict scrutiny even though it found that 
"welfare provides the means to obtain essential food, clothing, housing, and medical care."), 
superseded, St. ex rei. K.M. v. W. Va. Dept. of Health & Human Resources, 575 S.E.2d 393, 402 (W. 
Va. 2002) (The specific holding that "cash assistance cannot be terminated prior to a due process 
hearing" was superseded when "Congress made sweeping changes to this area of the law," but this is 
not addressed in this paper.). 
166. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I, 33 (1973). 
167. Cf Harper, 383 U.S. at 667 (quoting Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 370). 
168. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35-36. 
169. Id. at 35. 
170. I d. at 35-36. 
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But they are not values to be implemented by judicial intrusion into 
otherwise legitimate state activities. 171 
The majority, after determining that strict scrutiny would be 
inappropriate, went on to state what has been called "the un-held 
holding" of Rodriguez. 172 First, the Court recognized the possibility that 
"some identifiable quantum of education" 173 may be required to protect 
these established Constitutional rights. Second, whatever that quantum 
might be, it certainly existed in Texas at that time, even in the poorest 
districts. 174 This actually leaves open the question of whether some level 
of education is a fundamental right. Once a state provides education, is 
there a minimum level required that constitutes a fundamental right? 
Though the Court declined to exercise strict scrutiny because it found 
that education is not a federal fundamental right, one way to interpret 
Rodriguez is that the Court declined to exercise strict scrutiny because the 
fundamental interest in education was not implicated by the situation. 
However, the dissent made the point that there are rights the Court 
has found that are not explicit in the Constitution. 175 Justice Marshall 
argued for a less restrictive approach to constitutional analysis than the 
strict textualism adopted by the majority in Rodriguez. In Marshall's 
view, as the "nexus between the specific constitutional guarantee and the 
nonconstitutional interest draws closer," then that interest becomes more 
fundamental and judicial scrutiny should increase commensurately. 176 
This reasoning is in line with cases establishing the right to procreate/ 77 
the right to privacy, 178 the right to vote, 179 and the right to appeal a 
criminal conviction. 180 
C. Plyler v. Doe 
The debate over whether education is a fundamental right became 
even more confusing after the outcome of Plyler v. Doe. 181 Texas was 
171. Id. at 36 (internal citations omitted). 
172. Bitensky, supra n. 64, at 117. 
173. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 36. 
174. Id. at 37. 
175. Id. at 100 (Marshall,). dissenting). 
176. I d. at 102-03 (Marshall, J. dissenting). 
177. Skinner v. Okla., 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). 
178. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973). 
179. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 561-562. 
180. Griffin v. Ill., 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956) ("a State is not required by the Federal Constitution to 
provide appellate courts or a right to appellate review at all" but strict judicial scrutiny is still 
applied). 
181. Plyler, 457 U.S. 202. 
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denying children of illegal aliens entrance to public schools. 182 The Court 
held that this violated equal protection, even though the children were 
not citizens of the United States with the constitutional guarantees that 
follow from such citizenship. 183 The reasoning was not based on the 
fundamentality of the right to education. Rather, the legislation failed 
because the classification based on citizenship status did not further an 
important state interest-there is no rational basis on which to deny any 
child an education. 184 Essentially, the court dealt with the practical issue 
of the cost of education to governments. Not educating a child is more 
expensive than dealing with an un-educated adult, whether the adult is a 
citizen or not. 
But where does that leave us? There is no federal fundamental right 
to public education, but no child can rationally be denied an education. 
Is there any way to reconcile these seeming inconsistencies? Is there 
some fundamental right to a minimally adequate education? And if so, 
how is it to be protected? 
IV. STATE JUDICIARIES' TREATMENT OF THE RIGHT TO PUBLIC 
EDUCATION AFTER RODRIGUEZ 
Based on their own constitutions, the states have generally been more 
welcoming to claims of education as a fundamental right. While the 
federal constitution does not explicitly mention education, most state 
constitutions do put an affirmative duty on the state to provide 
education. 185 After failing to establish a federal fundamental right to 
education in Rodriguez, litigators and reformers turned to the education 
provisions in state constitutions with some success.186 
A classic case in this effort comes out of Kentucky: Rose v. Council for 
Better Education. 187 This was another school funding case where the 
plaintiffs were alleging an unconstitutional disparity. 188 This time 
however, the constitution in question was the Kentucky Constitution. 
The Kentucky court interpreted their constitution as creating a state 
fundamental right to education. 189 Furthermore, the court outlined a 
definition of a minimally adequate education, which has since become a 
182. !d. at 205. 
183. !d. at 210, 230. 
184. I d. at 230. 
185. Walsh, supra n. 1, at 281. 
186. Patt, supra n. 10, at 556. 
187. 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989). 
188. Id. at 190. 
189. Id. at 206. 
286 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL [2005 
guidepost for subsequent cases: 
[A]n efficient system of education must have as its goal to provide each 
and every child with at least the seven following capacities: (i) sufficient 
oral and written communication skills to enable students to function in 
a complex and rapidly changing civilization; (ii) sufficient knowledge of 
economic, social, and political systems to enable the student to make 
informed choices; (iii) sufficient understanding of governmental 
processes to enable the student to understand the issues that affect his 
or her community, state, and nation; (iv) sufficient self-knowledge and 
knowledge of his or her mental and physical wellness; (v) sufficient 
grounding in the arts to enable each student to appreciate his or her 
cultural and historical heritage; (vi) sufficient training or preparation 
for advanced training in either academic or vocational fields so as to 
enable each child to choose and pursue work intelligently; and (vii) 
sufficient levels of academic or vocational skills to enable public school 
students to compete favorably with their counterparts in surrounding 
states, in academics or in the job market. 190 
This type of adequacy argument has taken the stage after the failure of 
the more overt equal protection claims. 191 
The North Carolina Supreme Court held that equal access to 
participation in the state public school system is a fundamental right 
guaranteed by the state constitutional provisions and "protected by 
considerations of procedural due process."192 Likewise, Connecticut's 
Supreme Court found that whatever equal protection test is applied, "in 
Connecticut the right to education is so basic and fundamental that any 
infringement of that right must be strictly scrutinized." 193 West 
Virginia's Supreme Court held that mandatory requirements of a 
'"thorough and efficient system of free schools,'" found in the West 
Virginia Constitution, make education a fundamental, constitutional 
right. 194 Similarly, New Jersey's Supreme Court held that its 
constitution's guarantee of a "thorough and efficient system of public 
schooling" must be understood to embrace that educational opportunity 
190. I d. at 212. 
191. Pall, supra n. 10, at 556. 
192. Sneed v. Greensboro City Bd. ofEduc., 264 S.E.2d 106, 113 (N.C. 1980). But see Britt v. N.C. 
State Bd. of Educ., 357 S.E.2d 432, 436-37 (N.C. App. 1987) (State constitutional mandate that "equal 
opportunities shall be provided for all students," ld. at 436, does not confer upon "each student in 
the State ... a fundamental right to an education substantially equal to that enjoyed by every other 
student in the State," Id. at 434, but rather, only means that all students were entitled to "full 
participation in ... public schools, regardless of race or other classification;" Id. at 436, thus, 
disparity in educational opportunities in counties with large tax base as opposed to those in counties 
with small tax base did not result in constitutional violation.). 
193. Horton v Meskill, 376 A.2d 359,373 (Conn. 1977). 
194. Pauley v Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859,878 (W.Va. 1979) (quoting theW. Va. Const. art. 12 § 1). 
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which is needed in the contemporary setting to equip a child for his role 
as a citizen and as competitor in the labor market. 195 
Some states do not declare a strong fundamental right to education. 
Rather they cast it as a substantial right. A substantial right is afforded 
more constitutional protection than that provided by rational basis 
scrutiny, yet does not trigger the more stringent requirements of strict 
scrutiny. 1Y6 For example, in New York, when the state undertakes to 
provide free education to all students, "it must 'recognize a student's 
legitimate entitlement to a public education as a property interest,"' 
though not a fundamental right. 197 Such a property interest is protected 
by the due process clause.198 A federal district court in Utah, interpreting 
the Utah State Constitution, stopped short of creating a fundamental 
right to education, but held that the state has a duty to teach children 
living on Native American reservations. 199 This holding is in line with 
the reasoning of Plyler, that once the state has chosen to provide 
education it cannot rationally deny children from receiving it. 200 Perhaps 
a reason these state courts hold back from declaring education as a 
fundamental right stems from utilitarian concerns-state coffers are 
limited. Or, perhaps the judiciaries of these states feel institutionally 
incompetent to create and enforce educational policy, leaving it to the 
political branches. 
While many state courts have held in favor of either a fundamental 
or substantial right to education, some have not. The Illinois Supreme 
Court reasoned that the state compulsory education laws, which arguably 
restrict physical liberty, impose no duty under the federal or Illinois Due 
Process Clauses to provide students with a minimally safe and adequate 
education.201 Nebraska interpreted the education provision in its state 
constitution in such a way that despite the explicit enumeration of 
education, the court had no power to enforce it. The provision was not 
self-executing because it was directed only to the legislature.202 
195. Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273,295 (N.j. 1973). See also Buse v. Smith, 247 N.W.2d 141, 
149 (Wis. 1976) (Equal opportunity for education as defined by state constitution is a fundamental 
right.). 
196. In re Jessup, 379 N.Y.S.2d 626,632 (Fam. Ct. 1975) 
197. !d. (quoting Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565,574 (1975)). 
198. Id. 
199. Meyers ex rei Meyers v. Bd. of Educ., 905 F.Supp. 1544, 1568 (D. Utah 1995). The Utah 
Constitution provides that "The Legislature shall provide for the establishment and maintenance of 
the state's education systems including: (a) a public education system, which shall be open to all 
children of the state; and (b) a higher education system. Both systems shall be free from sectarian 
control." Utah Con st. art. I 0, § 1. 
200. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230. 
201. Lewis E. v. Spagnolo, 710 N.E.2d 798, 806 (Ill. 1999). 
202. St. ex rei. Shineman v. Bd. ofEduc., 42 N.W.2d 168,170 (Neb. 1950). 
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Some may view this lack of state constitutional protection as an 
inexcusable harm to children. Perhaps it is. But the range of response 
which states demonstrate is part of the strength of federalism. States can 
more freely experiment with varying solutions to multifaceted problems. 
The educational process is highly individualized and organic and does 
not lend itself well to centralized dictation. Experimentation across many 
states is desirable for determining best practices. There may be losses and 
harms in a number of states, but at least those harms would be limited to 
those states rather than spread across the entire Union. 
V. CONCLUSION: IS THERE A SUFFICIENT CONSTITUTIONAL AND 
PRACTICAL BASIS TO ESTABLISH A FEDERAL FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO 
PUBLIC EDUCATION? 
Experience teaches us that formal education is good for individuals 
and society. The existence of formal education is the way things ought to 
be-is the natural law. But in order for education to be provided on a 
broad, society-wide scale, positive law must be created.203 The federal 
judiciary has determined that the federal constitution does not create the 
positive law that protects educational rights. 204 However, current 
Supreme Court jurisprudence indicates a change in the winds. State 
judiciaries, analyzing constitutions with specific educational guarantees 
have come out largely in favor of a fundamental right to education, 
though not unanimously so.205 
Often lost in all the debate is the question of what government 
structure is best suited to make decisions regarding the funding, 
provision and superintendence of education. On one level, all agree 
regarding the importance of education. But is the federal government 
best suited to deal with educational policy issues? Are the state 
governments? What is the role of the judiciary in creating and enforcing 
the positive law aspects of educational policy? 
Using the analytical approach of Lawrence,206 it is possible to argue 
for a federal fundamental right to education. Education is critical to each 
individual. The nature of our economy is now such that a citizen can 
hardly exist without an education. In the past, this was not so. Now, 
without an education, a citizen is both economically and politically 
vulnerable. The trend across the state governments is to protect the right 
203. See supra Section II(B) (discussing natural law and positivism). 
204. See supra Section Ill(B) (discussing Rodriguez). 
205. See supra Section IV (discussing state education cases). 
206. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578-579. 
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to education.207 And education is preservative of other rights. This 
reasoning, rejected in Rodriguez,208 gains strength after Lawrence. 209 After 
all, it is rather absurd for our Constitution to ignore a child's right to 
education while protecting an adult's right to private sexual behavior. 
These arguments are only strengthened by the historical importance of 
education. 
Though there has never been an outright positive right to education, 
there are several federal actions that indicate its existence. Congress has a 
created a right to education for those with disabilities.210 The Supreme 
Court has consistently held for the parents' right to direct the education 
of their children. And even Rodriguez did not absolutely leave out the 
possibility of a right to education. 211 
Yet if public education is considered a federal fundamental right it 
could embroil the federal judiciary in administrative educational issues. 
A fundamental right should invoke strict scrutiny. 212 Strict scrutiny 
means that any governmental regulation must be narrowly tailored to 
accomplish a compelling interest. Few regulations survive such analysis. 
So any educational policy that anyone would care to litigate would most 
likely be struck down by the court. The State could not accurately predict 
how to create educational policy. The difficulties and costs associated 
with litigation could harm educational processes. Courts would have to 
depend upon mounds of sociology, rather than legal or constitutional 
principles, in order to make decisions. The judiciary could be forced to 
expound the minutest details of educational policy. 
Missouri v. fenkins213 is an example of what can happen when the 
judiciary takes on educational policy issues. The federal district court was 
attempting to enforce desegregation laws. By the time the issue reached 
the U.S. Supreme Court, the federal district court judge was ordering 
salary increases, ordering funding of educational programs, approving 
facility improvements and otherwise using judicial decrees to effect an 
increased attractiveness of the district. The course of the litigation took 
over eighteen years. A federal district court became mired in minute 
207. Supra, nn. 186-19S (discussing state education cases). 
208. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 3S ("Education, of course, is not among the rights afforded explicit 
protection under our Federal Constitution."). 
209. Lawrence, S39 U.S. at S78-79 (referring to "the components of liberty" as worthy of 
protection). 
210. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq. 
211. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 36-37 (acknowledging the possibility of a "quantum of education 
[could be] ... constitutionally protected"). 
212. Supra Section II(C)(iii) (discussing strict scrutiny). 
213. SIS U.S. 70 (199S). 
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educational procedures, and the resulting cost of litigation.214 However, 
what was the district court to do when the political branches of the state 
government were not desegregating the schools? The tension is difficult. 
The traditional repository for educational policy-making power is 
with the states. Such a federalist approach has the advantages of local 
control and of allowing for experimentation. The complex issues 
affecting educational processes and policies are not easily resolved. 
Finding that public education is a federal fundamental right would 
require the federal government to carry the responsibility to fund 
education. 215 Centralized control from the federal government may not 
be the best manner for controlling public education. 
Perhaps the best approach, that respects federalism issues and the 
competencies of the judiciary, while placing appropriate emphasis on the 
importance of education is for the federal judiciary to state explicitly the 
un-held holding of Rodriguez-that there is a right to some basic level of 
education, and that the states must determine and enforce this level. 216 
Such a finding would be in accord with natural law principles, that a right 
to education does exist,217 while avoiding embroiling the federal judiciary 
in day to day educational procedural matters or incurring additional 
federal funds. 218 
Brooke Wilkins 
214. I d. at 75-80 (reciting the lengthy procedural history of the case). 
215. See Bitensky, supra n. 64, at 632-33. 
216. Supra nn. 172-174 and accompanying text. 
217. Supra Section II(B) (discussing natural law and positivism). 
218. Jenkins, SIS U.S. 75-80 (discussing the judiciary problems of enforcing desegregation 
provisions in a Missouri School District). 
